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THE RIGHT OF A MARRIED WOMAN TO BRING AN ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES WHERE THE HUSBAND HAS REFUSED TO JOIN.-One of the interesting developments in the law of

community property has been the rule which declares that a married
woman while living with her husband has no right to prosecute an
action for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a third person
without procuring her husband to join as a party plaintiff in the action.
While, under the statute,' the common law disabilities of a married
woman are completely removed and while under the same statute the
wife has the same right to appeal to the courts for redress for any
unjust usurpation of her natural or property rights, that the husband
has, yet under the judicial construction of the statutory definition of
community property, the conclusion is reached denying the wife any
right to appeal to the courts in her own name, for redress for the
usurpation of her most sacred right, namely the right of personal
security.
The first case to establish this doctrine in Washington is the case
of Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Co. Relying on the fundamental
premise that the right to sue for a tort which one has suffered is a
chose-in-action and therefore property, the court reasoned that being
property and not being acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or descent or

' Rem. Comp. Stat, §6901, P C. §142:2.
23 Wash. 592. 28 Pae. 1021, 16 L. R. A. 808, 98 A. S. R. 72 (1892).
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as the rents, issues or profits of separate property, it must be community property under these statutory definition of community property. 3
Being community property, the right to sue rests in the member of the
community who has the right of disposition and control of the community personalty, i. e., the husband.4 Thus the court held that
while the wife was a proper party, the husband was the only necessary
party. The same doctrine was affirmed in the case of Davis v. Seattle.
In Schneider v. Biberger' the doctrine was carried a step farther.
In that case the action was brought for injuries caused by an indecent
assault on the wife. At the time the action was brought the plaintiff
and her husband were divorced, but at the time the action arose the
parties were living together in the marital relation. The court held
that the husband was a necessary party plaintiff. The fact that there
had been a divorce did not change the status of the cause of action as
common property The husband was still a necessary party A very
significant feature of this case, however, was the dissent raised by
Mr. Justice Fullerton. His dissenting opinion is as follows. "The
wrong here committed, if any, was an unjust usurpation of the wife's
natural right and in my opinion she may maintain an action therefor
in her individual name under Rem. & Bal. Code, Sec. 5926."'
This dissenting opinion apparently did not effect any change in the
rule, since in the case of Hammond v. Jackson" the court affirmed the
old doctrine. In that case the sole question presented was whether a
married woman living with her husband could make a valid contract
with an attorney to prosecute an action in damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a third person. The court held that
she could not make such a contract, that since the husband alone can
maintain such an action, it must follow that he has the right to have
a voice in any contract that affects the condition upon which the
action is to be maintained. The court says that to hold otherwise is
to hold that the husband's management and control of community
personalty is not absolute as the statute pre-supposes, but is subject
to such contracts as the other spouse may choose to make concerning it.
The case which seems to decide the question squarely is the case of
Hynes v. Colman Dock Co.' That case was decided on the pleadings.
The plaintiff, a married woman, sued the Colman Dock Co. for
damages arising from personal injuries sustained by her through the
alleged negligence of the defendant. Her husband was made a party
defendant for the reason as alleged, that the plaintiff was unable to
procure his consent to join as party plaintiff. A demurrer to the
complaint was sustained on the ground of defect of parties plaintiff,
Rem. Comp. Stat. §6892, P C. §1433.
Rem. Comp. Stat. §6892, P C. §1433.
'37 Wash. 223, 79 Pac. 784 (1905).
'T6 Wash. 504, 136 Pae. 701 (1913).
Rem. Comp. Stat. §6901, P C. §142-2.
'89 Wash. 510, 154 Pac. 1106 (1916).
'108 Wash. 64-0 185 Pac. 617 (1919).
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and so the question before the court on appeal was whether a wife
can maintain an action for damages for personal injuries without
joining her husband as party plaintiff, when he has merely refused
so to join. The court held that in the absence of any allegation to
the effect that the husband in refusing to bring the action was squandering community assets, the wife could not maintain the action, citing
Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Co., Davis v. Seattle, Hammond v.
Jackson and Schneider v. Biberger supra.
While it does not appear from this case that there was any reason
for not joining the husband as plaintiff, yet assuming that a good
cause of action existed and that the husband, although acting honestly
refused to join in the action, from the cases cited it would seem that
our court holds that in such a situation, the wife could not bring the
action, on the theory that the judgment of the husband, the manager
of the community, should control.
If the fundamental premise that such a chose-in-action is community
property be conceded, this rule is logically correct. However, the difficulty is in conceding the fundamental premise. It is an elementary
rule that a cause of action, viewed as a distinct right, takes its character as separate or common, from the character of the primary right
violated. Logically, it would seem that if the primary right violated
is that of the wife's personal security, then the cause of action must
itself be separate. Quoting McKAY ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY-'
"Our whole theory of legal remedies is based on the principle that the
right to have legal redress takes on the legal character of the primary
right. The cause of action is given as a means to an end. The end
sought by the law, is to work out restoration of the violated right or
in lieu thereof compensation for the wrong.
The cause of action takes its character as separate or common from the right violated."
Hence to hold that a cause of action for personal injuries to the
wife is community property is to hold that the right of the wife's
personal security is not her own but belongs to the community. If
the cause of action and the compensation be taken from the wife her
right of personal security is very seriously impaired. It should also be
considered that this right of personal security is inherently an individual,
a separate right. While it is true that the husband has sustained some
loss and to that extent should be allowed to say whether or not an
action should be brought, nevertheless the husband does not, and can
not in the nature of things hold the wife's right of personal security
and hence should not be permitted to recover for the violation thereof.
"It does not belong to him or to the community The wife's physical
pain and suffering are not the loss of the husband nor the loss of the
community."
It should follow then, that the violation of a right so
intensely separate and individual as-the right of personal security should
give rise to a separate cause of action.
However, conceding for the sake of argument that the chose-in-action
"MAK
IcKr o2 CoMMu.mvrY PROPERTY (.0nd Ed.), p. 248, §378.
11McKAY ox ComsruiTY PROPERTY (Ond Ed.), p. 969, §398.
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is a community right, the social and moral wrong which results from
the application of the rule leads to very serious doubts as to its wisdom. Under the rule of Hynes v. Colman Dock Co., supra, in order
for the wife to protect her rights, it is necessary that she separate from
her husband. Under this rule, although the right of action is perfect
and although there is a very strong probability of recovery, yet if the
husband obstinately refuses to join in the action, although honestly so,
the only way that the wife can save her rights is to break the marital
tie. At the risk of lessening the control of the husband a slight degree,
it would seem that the general welfare of society would be materially
enhanced by allowing the wife to bring the action in her own name.
Probably realizing the injustice of the rule and the very real moral
wrong involved, the legislatures of Louisiana, California and Texas
have changed it. The Louisiana act 2 was passed in 1902 and it provided in effect that the wife, not only could bring the action in her
own name, but could also keep the amount recovered as her separate
property The California acte, was passed in 1913. It merely gave the
right to the wife to bring the action, the damages recovered being community property The Texas statute' was passed in 1915 and was
similar in terms to that of Louisiana.
It seems then that the rule is breaking down. In Washington, it
still prevails, although in the recent case of Wampler v. Bienert" the
court held that after the husband had deserted the wife, she could
sue in her own name for her personal injuries. It is true that this
decision can be reconciled with the former decisions on the theory that
the wife was living separate and apart from the husband and hence
could bring the action under the code," yet the court recognizes a difference between a right of action for personal injuries to the wife and
other community property In the opinion of Mr. Justice Pemberton,
the following statement is made "The injury to the wife is not alone
an injury to the community but to the wife personally and the injuries
may be endured long after the community is dissolved."
The adoption of legislation similar to that of Texas and Louisiana
is advisable. The rule in force in Washington really contradicts the
fundamental theory of the community system. It was unquestionably
the intention of the Legislature in the adoption of the system to emancipate married women, to remove the common law disabilities.' Yet
the application of the rule of Hynes v. Colman Dock Co., supra,
deprives her of her most valuable and sacred right, that of personal
security It declares that to be common property, which if property
at all, is inherently separate. It is submitted that the rule is contrary
to the modern tendency of the decisions and legislation and should be
abrogated.
Edward Starm.
1"

Acts of 190;'?, Act No. 68, p. 95 (Louisiana).

" Code of Civil Procedure, §370 (California).

"Complete Texas Statutes
125 Wash. 494, -016 Pac.
"Rem. Comp. Stat., §181,
" Rem. Comp. Stat. §6901,

(1920) Art. 46-1a, Acts of 1915, Chap. 54, Sec. 1.
855 (1923).
P C. §8257.
P C. §142;2.
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EVIDENCE: CONTRADICTION OF COLLATERAL MATTER-It has been
said so many times that a party is concluded by the answers of a witness on any collateral matter, that the real rule and the reasons therefor
are very generally misunderstood and frequently misapplied.
Some cases and some textbooks draw a very clear distinction between
impeachment as applied to a collateral matter and contradiction as applied to a collateral matter. The distinguishing feature seems to be found
in whether or not the answer sought to be refuted is elicited on direct
examination or cross-examination. If an answer given on direct examination is to be disproven it is called contradiction. If an answer
elicited on cross-examination is to be disproven it is called impeachment.
It is obvious, of course, that this is all a matter of definition and despite
a confusion of terms the question of refuting answers elicited either
on direct or cross-examination is really a matter of impeachment and
by the better writers is generally called impeachment by contradiction.
Definitions are not particularly material to our present inquiry as we
are here chiefly interested in applying this rule of evidence to collateral
matters.
The term "collateral matter" is frequently misunderstood. A test
of whether a matter is collateral is: Is the cross-examining party
entitled to prove the matter in support of his case?'
First, considering collateral matter elicited on cross-examination, the
rule is well settled in all jurisdictions that a party is bound by the
answers thus obtained. 2 It is this rule, so well and firmly settled, that
has confused lawyers and judges alike concerning the right of a person
to contradict answers given on a collateral matter in direct-examination.
"The general rule is that, when a witness is cross-examined on a matter
collateral to the issue, his answer cannot be subsequently contradicted
by the party putting the question, but this limitation only applies to
answers on the cross-examnnation. It does not affect answers to the
"3s
examination in chief.
There is authority to the contrary. 4 This line of authority states

110 Exer. PL. & Pa. 996; 'WnuATo's Cam. Bv., Tenth Edition, § 484, and
cases there cited.
-28 R. C. L. 620; 10 Excr Py- & Pa. 295.
'McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 431, 27 S. W 628 (1894) Furst v. Second
Ave. R. O., 72 N. Y. 54

(1878)

Van Tassell v. New York, etc., R. Co, 20

N. Y. Supp. 708 (1892), -1 N. Y. Supp. 1131, 37 N. E. 566 (1893), State v.
Goodwin, 32 W Va. 177, 9 S. E. 85 (1889) People v. Roemer 114 Cal. 51,

45 Pac. 1003 (1896), People v. Evans, 41 Pac. 444 (Cal., 1895) Grimes V.
Hill, 15 Colo. 359, -5 Pac. 698 (1891) Batdor/f v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 61 Pa.
St. 179 (1869), Forde v. Com., 16 Gratt (Va.) 547 (1864) Butler v. State, 31

Ark. 480 (1879), State v. Sargent, 3- Me. 429 (1851) Polk v. State, 40 Ark.
482 (1833), 98 R. C. L. 620; Wharton's Cialm. Ev., Tenth Edition, §484, and
notes.

'Lambert v.Hamlin, 73 N. H. 138, 59 AUt. 941, 6 Ann. Cas. 713 (1905),
Merchants' L. Assoc. v. Yoakum, 98 Fed. 251, 39 C. C. A. 56 (1899) Blakey v.
Blakey, 33 Ala. 611 (1859) overruling Dozier v. Joyce, 8 Port. (Ala.) 303;
Ortez v. Jewett, 23 Ala. 66- (1853), Com. v. Fitzgerald, 0 Allen (Mass.) 297
(1861),

Bhrman v. Whelan, 40 So. 430 (Miss., 1906)

Bullock v. State, 65

N. J. L. 557, 47 AUt. 62 (1900) State v. Hendrick, 70 N. J. L. 41, 56 AtL 247
(1903) Continental Nat. Bank v. Nashville First Nat. Bank, 108 Tenn. 374,
68 S.W 497 (1902), Craig v. Rohrer, 63 Ill.
325 (1872).
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the rule as follows: "The question is whether the statement of an
immaterial fact can be contradicted, if it comes out on the examination
of a witness in chief.
It seems to us that if an immaterial fact is
stated by a witness of his own accord, or as introductory merely to
material testimony, or if the party who calls a witness is permitted,
without objection, to question him as to immaterial facts, the irrelevant
testimony must be regarded in the same manner as if it had come out
on cross-examination,
and the other party cannot call witnesses to
5
contradict

it."

The reasons advanced in support of this line of authority to many
courts appears very persuasive. They place their holding usually on
two grounds1. If contradiction is allowed on collateral matters elicited on direct
examination, the result would be a confusion of issues,
2. If a party is so careless, negligent and sleepy as to permit collateral
matters to be injected in a direct examination that party should not be
permitted to take advantage of the situation.
The contrary rule that collateral matter elicited on direct examination can be contradicted is based on several grounds, the most usual of
which is that the collateral matter was injected by a party to better his
position before the court and is frequently permitted to go into the
record on counsel's statement that it is merely preliminary It does
seem unreasonable, particularly in a criminal case where the rule has
a very powerful sway, that a defendant may thus unfairly place himself
in a desirable position before the court. For example. Supposing a
defendant charged with burglary gets on the witness stand and in
rapid succession makes a series of statements to the effect that he has
been a minister of the gospel, that he has never touched intoxicating
liquor, used dope, etc. Now if these matters had been elicited on crossexamination by the prosecuting attorney, the state probably would be
bound thereby under the rule above noted, but here the defendant has
improved his position before the court and jury by a series of false
statements. In fairness, and bearing in mind the danger, in the eyes
of the jury, of objecting to a defendant giving a bit of his life history,
the state should not be denied the opportunity of contradicting those
statements.
In the state of Washington this particular point has not been passed
upon by our own Supreme Court. In every case in which the question
has arisen on appeal the contradiction sought to be admitted resulted
from an answer elicited on cross-examination. 6 In some cases our
Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 153 (1834).
Among these cases are:
State v. Carpenter 32 Wash. 254 (1903) State v. McLain, 43 Wash. 267,
271, (86 Pac. 390, 2) (1906) Anderson v. Globe Nay. Co., 57 Wash. 502, 506;
107 Pac. 376, 7 (1910) Wharton v. Tacoma Fir Door Co., 58 Wash. 124, 125 •
107 Pac. 1057, 8 (1910) Kirk v. Seattle Jlectrzc Co., 58 Wash. 983, 289 108
Pac. 604, 7 (1910)
Finigan v. Sullivan, 65 Wash. 625, 627 118 Pac. 888, 9
(1911) State v. Stone, 66 Wash. 625, 631, 120 Pac. 76, 8 (191-).
6
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Supreme Court has ruled that the contradiction was properly admitted
because it was contradiction of a material matter elicited on crossexamination.7
It is, therefore, yet an open question what our own Supreme Court
will do, but if it follows the weight of authority and what, it is submitted, is the weight of reason it will adopt the rule that answers
elicited on direct examination on collateral matters may be contradicted.
Robert S. Macfarlane.

MAY A MAN PROVIDE IN His WILL THAT His WIFE SHALL NOT
TAKE UNDER IT UNLESS SHE SHALL SURVIVE HIM FOR A PERIOD OF
FORTY-EIGHT Houas?-The advantages are apparent that might be
gained by a man including in his will the provision that his wife should
not take under it unless she should survive him for a period of, say,
forty-eight hours. As an example, there is the famous French case of
Fair v. Vanderbilt, in which both spouses were killed, the wife surviving the husband fifty-nine seconds, and of which a learned author
once remarked, "It was the first time in history that a man and his
wife were ever killed while riding together." No provision had been
made in contemplation of either co-accidental or incidental death.
These two vast estates became merged into one. How much more
equitable it would have beeri to let the estates remain in the respective
families. Due to this sudden and unexpected death, one family was
enriched, to the detriment of the other. Who can say this was a just
enrichment, using this principle as a comparison, and that such a distribution was any other than a mere interpretation of words in a will
or statute?
Every practicing attorney knows of some local application of this
distribution in his community. Because of the risk of automobile or
similar accident, each spouse may advantageously incorporate a clause
in his will providing for just such contingencies. Would such a will,
then, be permissible in Washington? Objections may be raised that
the statutes as they now exist are mandatory, in a way that would
prevent such a will, that such a provision would leave the title to
devised property nowhere during the interim, that the court would
declare an intestacy. It may even be urged that the same result may
be effected through some established form, such a life estate.
The statutes which must be taken into consideration are as follows:
Remington's Compiled Statutes §1366 reads: "When a person dies
seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any right thereto or
entitled to any interest therein in fee or for life of another, his title
shall vest immediately in his heirs or devisees, subject to his debts,
family allowance, expenses of administration and any other charges
for which such real estate is liable under existing laws. No adminis"Allard v. Nlorthwestern Contract Co., 61 Wash. 14, 116 Pae. 457 (1911)
State v. Hood, 103
Wash. 489, 491, 175 Pac. 27, 8 (1918).
MclVall v. Sandygren, 100 Wash. 133, 170 Pac. 561 (1918)
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tration of the estate of such decedent and no decree of distribution or
other finding, or order, of any court shall be necessary in any case to
vest such title in the heirs or devisees, but the same shall vest in the
heirs and devisees instantly upon the death of such decedent: PROVIDED that no person shall be deemed a devisee until the will has
"
been probated.
Rem. Comp. State. §1370, enacted at the same time as Section 1366,
as a part of the same bill, provides: "This act shall apply to community real property and also to separate estates, and upon the death
of either husband or wife, title of all community real property shall
vest immediately in the person or persons to whom the same shall go,
pass, descend or be devised as provided in Section 3303 in the Code
of Washington 1881."
Since the wife's vested interests may not be alienated by the husband,
it is her contingent interest in the husband's vested interests that may
accrue to her benefit, according to the intents and desires of the husband.
We must look to Section 3308 of the 1881 Code to ascertain the gist
of the statute which was incorporated by reference. "Upon the death
of either husband or wife, one-half of the community property shall go
to the survivor, subject to the community debts, and the other half
shall be subject to the testamentary disposition of the deceased husband
or wife, subject also to the community debts. In case no testamentary
disposition shall have been made by the deceased husband or wife of his
or her half of the community property, it shall descend equally to the
legitimate issue of his, her or their bodies. If there be no issue of said
deceased living or none of their representatives living, then the said
community property shall all pass to the survivor, to the exclusion of
collateral heirs, subject to the community debts, the family allowances
and the charges and expenses of administration."
These statutes are not mandatory when it is possible to go beyond
their mere words and take instead, for our general principle, those
statutes which direct that generally, all code provisions shall be liberally
construed and shall not be limited by any rules of strict construction,
and further, that the intention of the testator shall be ascertained as
far as possible. The statute which provides that "The executor or
administrator shall take into his possession all the estate of the deceased,
real and personal, and collect all debts due to the deceased," fixes merely
an administrative duty, and does not involve the passing of title to
property

1

Where would the title be, during the forty-eight hour period that
would ensue in all instances save where the eventuality guarded against
had occurred? There are several possibilities. First, it may be in the
executor or the administrator, secondly, it may be in the remainder man
as trustee until the expiration of the conditional period, thirdly in
the heirs at law, or lastly, in the probate court.
The principle is undoubtedly true that, broadly speaking, the law
favors an early vesting of title. The Washington case of Shufeldt v.
'Gibson v. Slater 49 Wash. 347, 84 Pac. 648 (1906).
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Shufeldt, 2 acknowledges this doctrine, but in addition holds that it
will not be permitted to override the contrary intention of the testator,
and is resorted to only for the purpose of avoiding perpetutities, intestacy, illegal suspension of the power of alienation, and to effect an
intention which might otherwise be defeated. So that principle, the
motivating force of the objection of "Where is the title meanwhile?"
should not be allowed to defeat the testator's intention, in the will
proposed.
However, there are several possible answers to the question. Could
not the title be held. to be in the executor during the forty-eight hour
period? In discussing a non-intervention will case, the Washington
supreme court makes statements which are in reality germane also to
the general descent and distribution of property, whether it be by a
mere general will or by a non-intervention will.
It was held by this court in Balch v. Smith,' and affirmed in State ex
rel. Phinney4 "that, under the general probate act, title would not
pass to the heir, excepting through the intervention of the probate
court, and that the assertion of heirship, without the aid of an adjudication by that court was not sufficient to authorize him to maintain an
action against the adverse holder. This must have been upon the
theory that the title vested in the court, instead of the heir, until the
title was adjudicated, or in other words, that the court was, in a sense,
a trustee created by law to hold and dispose of the title under the provisions of the law But under the law in question, where does the title
rest? Unlike the historical coffin it cannot be suspended, but must abide
somewhere. It is not in the heir, under the theory of Balch v. Smith.
It is not in the court, because, under the special provisions of the law
under which it was drawrx, (non-intervention of wills statute) the
court is excluded from any participation in the distribution of the
estate or its management. Its only logical abiding place then is in the
trustee or agent appointed by the devisor."
It could very easily be assumed by the court that all executors were
trustees, even though at times, in a limited way, to carry out the
provisions of the will. Especially where no provisions are directly in
contravention with the directions and duties of an executor. Going
one step further, it might even be said that, by implication, authority
is vested in the wife to hold the title temporarily until the beneficial
use shall accrue, say forty-eight hours later, since that is the obvious
intent and purpose of the husband's peculiar provision of his will.
An analogous situation is furnished in cases of bankruptcy. Upon
filing a petition in bankruptcy or upon petition by three creditors,
a technical bankruptcy is constituted and by statute, title is divested of
the bankrupt and placed in the trustee. Yet how can the title vest in
the trustee when one is not appointed until ten days have elapsed,
giving all of the bankrupt's creditors an opportunity to file claims
against his remaining assets? It is only after a meeting of these credi'130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924).
'4 Wash. 497, 30 Pac. 648 (1892).

'21 Wash. 186, 57 Pac. 337 (1899).
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tors, and a selection by them of a trustee that it is possible for the title
actually to vest, as the law directs. The title in the meantime was
where it had previously rested, namely, in the bankrupt, as trustee for
his creditors. There is this nominal period of time,-here approximately ten days-sufficient notice to all the world of the true status
of the corpus, z. e., either assets or estate, so that no perversion of the
property could be made to the detriment of creditors, whereby title
might pass to a bona fide holder for value and without notice. Therefore, even though by statute, the law directs that title shall vest immediately in the trustee in bankruptcy, it demonstrates the inconsistency between theory and fact and proves that the law is only mandatory in analogous cases where and when conditions so come together
as to make it not only possible, but reasonably practicable. And so
it appears, regarding the main topic, that title may wait the intervening period of forty-eight hours, until the actual determination of the
status of the beneficiaries.
The case of Fitzgerald v. Ayers,5 where a husband and wife each
named the other as principal beneficiary in his will, each providing
that if the other died first, their foster son should become the sole
beneficiary Both husband and wife were frozen to death, there being
no evidence tending to show which died first. The foster son took
under the will in preference to the next of kin.
It is well established in the common law that there is no presumption of survivorship or of simultaneous death where persons meet
death in a common disaster. 6 It is a fact to be proved by the claimant.7
When the claimant cannot establish the survivorship under the English view, the gift over fails, and the property passes into the residuum,
or by intestacy 8 Precisely the same result is reached in this country
where the property is distributed as if the deaths were simultaneous. 9
In the United States, however, effect has been given, in construing a
will providing for a gift over, if the principal legatee "dies before I do"
to the obvious intention of the testator that if, for any reason, the
primary beneficiary cannot take the property with an effective power to
dispose thereof, the gift over is to prevail.1" Under the American construction, the claimant in the principal case, takes without the necessity
of establishing a survivorship. This seems obviously the only just result.
The case of Young Women s Christian Association v. French was one in
which the testatrix and her son met simultaneous death in a shipwreck,
in which the will provided that a gift over should take place provided
her son did not survive her and if he did, he was to take all, the husS179 S. W -089 (1915 Tex. Unrep'ted).
'Underwood v. Wing, 19 Beav. 459 (1854)

Newell v. Nichols, 12 Hun.

(N.Y.) 601 (1S78).
Wing v. Augrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 182 (1860) Newell v.
RElliott v. Smith, 22 Ch. Div. 236 (1878).
'.ohnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 111, 13 AtI. 132 (1888)
126, 37 At. 634 (1897).
Y W C. A. Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401 (1903)
Institute, 191 N. Y 254, 117 App. Div. 698, 83 N. E. 981,

Nichols, supra.
Re Wilbor 20 R. I.
St. John v. Andrews
-14 U. S. 19 (1909).
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band having died previously and therefore not before the court. Mr.
Chief Justice Fuller said.
"But the argument is that the testatrix's wishes cannot be carried
out, inasmuch as it is insisted each of the devises and bequests was on
the express condition of survivorship, and to give effect to the alleged
intention would require the interpolation of some phrase covering the
contingency of inability to ascertain survivorship, which interpolation
would be wholly inadmissible.
"This, however, is matter of construction, and if the state of facts
at the time of Mrs. Rhodes' death did not substantially differ from
what the will shows she contemplated when it was executed, then no
interpolation is required, and the property must go according to the
intention necessarily deducible."
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court will not declare an
intestacy where there is a possibility of effectuating the intentions of
the testator. Merely because it is shown that there is no intention
of a fee simple vesting immediately in the wife, is no indication that
there will be either an intestacy or a forced vesting but the property
will rather "go according to the intention necessarily deducible."
Washington, too, staunchly upholds the doctrine of intent. In Davis
v. Brown,"' the court speaks upon the fundamental rules in the construction of wills:
"The intention which controls in the construction of a will is that
which is manifest, either expressly or by necessary implication, from
the language of the will, as viewed, in the case of ambiguity, in the
light of the situation of the testator and the circumstances surrounding
him at the time it was executed, although technical rules are not used,
or, as is sometimes said, the testator's intention must be ascertained
"
from the four corners of the will.
The court says that these pnnciples have been recognized since the
earliest decisions in this state.' 2 Shufeldt v. Shufeldt,' 3 reaffirms the
doctrine in all the preceding cases and quotes Remington's Compiled
Statutes, § 1415
"All courts and others concerned in the execution of wills shall have
and meaning
due regard to the direction of the will, and the true intent
4
of the testator, in all matters brought before them."'
The court has by law and precept given close scrutiny to the intents
and circumstances surrounding the making of wills and in the most
111 Wash. 121, 191 Pac. 1098 (1920).
Newport v. Newport, 5 Wash. 114, 31 Pac. 428 (1892), and subsequently
in Webster v. Thorndyke, 11 Wash. 390, 39 Pac. 677 (1895), Martin V. Moore,
49 Wash. 288, 9- Pac. 1087 (1908), Peck v. Peck, 76 Wash. 548, 137 Pac. 137
(1913) Denton v. Schnezder 80 Wash. 506, 14, Pac. 9 (1914) la re Mora's
Estate, 95 Wash. 428, 163 Pac. 922 (1917) In re Peter's Estate, 101 Wash.
572, 172 Pac. 870 (1918) In re Wilson's Estate, 111 Wash. 491, 191 Pac. 610

1920), and in the instant case, Davis v. Brown, 112 Wash. 121, 191 Pac. 1098
1920).
"130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924).
"In re MacMartin's Estate, 131 Wash. 199, 29 Pac. 530 (19;24).
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interpretative manner has endeavored to carry out that intention, provided it was not against statutory provisions or public policy
It -is now necessary that we examine some of the decisions of our
courts in regard to the actual application of these principles.
In Reeves Executors v. School District No. 5915 the testator provided
that the balance of his property, real and personal, should descend to
his crippled son Charles, excepting his share of the interest that he
and R_ J. Reeves held jointly on a section of land.
In case of
Charles' death, it was his desire that his sole property should be
applied to the school fund of Wilbur, Washington. The testator
died three days later and the son Charles died four year later,
Under Ballinger's
single, under twenty-one and without a will.
Code, §4508, Remington's Compiled Statutes, §1409, "Every devise of land in any will shall be construed to convey all the estate
of the devisor therein which he could lawfully devise, unless it shall
appear clearly by the will that he intended to convey a less estate."
This devise therefore was an unequivocal, direct and positive devise
of an absolute estate, and not restricted by ambiguous and uncertain
provisions following in the will. Upon the death of the testator during the lifetime of the devisee, the will conveyed an absolute title.
This is merely affirming the doctrine set forth by Judge Chadwick.
that the title to real property shall vest immediately upon the death
of the testator.
In Moore v. Martin,"6 the testator left a will devising to his daughter Mary one-half of the proceeds of his undivided one-third interest
in certain lands which should be unsold at his death, and a similar
provision was made for the minor son Amos. The will was thereafter
admitted to probate and the executor was permitted to sell the land
to the plaintiff. Mr. Chief Justice Hadley held that "It was the
intention of the executor to convey the interest of the deceased in the
land and divide the proceeds among the children and, therefore, the
title to the land did not vest in the children at the death of the testator.
The executor became the
trustee for all purposes necessary to execute
17
the terms of the will.'
The terms of the trust could not be carried out without the power
to sell the land and to transfer the title thereto. Mr. Hadley quotes
2 UNDERHILL, LAW OF WILLS, §781
"If the purposes of the trust require that the trustee shall take the
fee simple of the legal interest in order that those purposes may be
carried out, he will take an estate of inheritance, though no words of
inheritance have been used by the testator in devising the legal interest.
Hence, if the interest given to the beneficiary through it was devised to
' 24 Wash. -08-, 64 Pae. 752 (1901).
" 49 Wash. 088, 94 Pac. 1087 (1908).
"Newport v. Newport, 5 Wash. 114, 31 Pac. 428 (1892) Seattle v. McDonald, 26 Wash. 98, 66 Pac. 145 (1901) In re McDonald's Estate, 29 Wash. 422,
69 Pac. 1111 (1902).
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him in indeterminate language, is greater than the legal interest devised to the trustee, the trust estate will be enlarged in the trustee
to answer all the purposes of the trust. If the carrying out of the
purposes of the trust require that the trustee shall take a fee, equity
will create a fee simple in him by implication without the use of the
word 'heirs.' "
It will be seen that the executor or administrator was impliedly a
temporary trustee for a specific purpose, who was to hold the property
in the,,interim until the testator's intention could be effected. Could
not the estate vest in the executor or even the devisee wife as trustee,
until the expiration of the forty-eight hours?
A life estate could be created by necessary words, and, to a restricted
degree, effectuate the purpose of the testator. But this would be very
unsatisfactory in case the wife survived the testator for any considerable time, for she would be deprived of the privileges of the estate in
fee simple.
Stephen Darden Brown.

MAY AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES BE BROUGHT IN A STATE COURT
BY A SEAMAN INJURED IN THE COURSE OF His DUTY, OR BY His
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CASE OF His DEATH, UNDER SECTION THIRTY-THREE OF THE JONES AcT?-Section 33 of the Jones
Act,' amending Section 20 of the Seamen's Act of 1915,2 gives to a

seaman injured in the course of his duty, or his personal representatives in case of his death, the right to proceed at his election under the
provisions of the Employers' Liability Act.3 The last sentence of the
Jones Act, it will be noticed, reads as follows: "Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located."
The question is, what is the meaning of the words "the court of
the district"? DEid Congress mean the federal court or did it intend
'Sec. 33 jones Act (Passed June 5, 1920)- "That any seaman who shall
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election,
maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in the case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action
for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for
death in the case of railroad employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located." 41 Stats. at Large
1007, U. S. Comp. Stats. Ann., 1923 Supp. §8337a, Fed. Stats. Ann., 2nd ed.,
1920 Supp. p. 927.
"Fed. Stats. Ann., 1916 Supp. p. 251.
'35 Stats. at Large 66; 36 Stats. at Large 291, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916,
vol. 8, §8662.
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to give jurisdiction to the state courts also?

This question has been

accompanied by another, equally important, which concerns the right
of the defendant to remove an action brought under the act in question from the state court to the federal court according to Section 28
of the Judicial Code. 4 This right of removal was expressly refused

to those defending an action under the Employers' Liability Act in
a state court,4a so the difficulty here is to determine whether the language of Section 33 shows an intention on the part of Congress to
embrace that provision.

While there are a number of decisions touch-

ing these questions they are not all in harmony, so it will be the purpose here to set forth the gist of these holdings and to attempt to draw
a conclusion as to their probable effect.
The first case to appear was that of Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co.,
decided December 27, 1921. The question was whether the plaintiff
had the right to remand the cause to the state court from whence the
defendant had secured its removal. As to this right of removal it
was held that Section 33 referred only to the rights and remedies of the
plaintiff, and as the removal provision of the Employers' Liability Act
applied only to the defendant it could not be available. It was also
held that the words of the last sentence of Section 33, above quoted,
referred to district courts only and vested exclusive jurisdiction therein.6
The authority of the Wenzler case was followed exactly by the case
of Malia v. Southern Pacific Co.
The case of Petterson v. Hobbs, Wall & Co.8 concludes that the
state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction and bases
its conclusion upon another section of the Jones Act, not connected
with Section 33, which provides concurrent jurisdiction. 9 The reasoning is that the intention of Congress appears in the words of that sec
tion and that the same should be applied to Section 33. The final
conclusion is, however, that the defendant has the power of removal
to the federal courts, so no appreciable divergence from the Wenzler
case was made.
' (Amended Jan. !20, 1914) U. S. Comp. Stats. 1916 vol. 1, §1010.
4

a

U.

S. Comp. Stat. 1916, vol. 8, §8662.

277 Fed. 819 (Decided by Judge Cushman, Western District of Waslungton, Dec., 1921).
Judge Cushman there said: "If the removal statute be in any sense a
remedy, as distinguished from a right, it is then the remedy of the defendant.
But section 20 (Section 33 of Jones Act), in speaking of rights and remedies,
is not referring to those of the defendant, but to the rights ana remedies of
the plaintiff at common law."
The court went even further in its statement and held that: "That portion
of section 8662 and section 28 denying removal does not modify the common
law in cases of personal injuries. It modifies the statute law of removal."
'293 Fed. 902 (N. Y., July, 1923).
1300 Fed. 811 (Cal., Nov. 10, 1923).
9 U. S. Comp. Stats. Ann. Supp. 19-3, §8146A M. M. M.
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The next case in point of the date of the decision was that of.
Reyes v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,'0 an action.
for the death of a seaman. Judge Garvin makes a distinction in the
wording of Section 33, where, in providing a remedy for personal
injury and for death, reference is made to the Employers' Liability Act,
The statute reads in regard to personal injury- "
and in such
actions all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employes shall apply."
In regard to actions for death, the statute reads:
All
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of actions for death in the case of railway employes shall apply"
In short, it is held that the intention of the framers of the act was
to include the removal provision of the Employers' Liability Act only
in cases where the action was one for the death of a seaman.
In regard to the Wenzler and the M1falia cases, supra, the court
says: "Whether or not (they) were correctly decided, each is a case
involving personal injury, not death."
District Judge Neterer, in our own Ninth District, decided the
case of Lorang v. Alaska S. S. Co." The holding in this case supported that of the Reyes case, supra. It was said, in substance, that
inasmuch as the statute extended to seamen "all statutes of the United
States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employes", and as the removal
provision "isnot of a remedy" and "isnot a vested right", that such
removal provision could not be available. This case cited as authority
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, which will be discussed later.
There are three cases holding contrary to those previously touched
upon, all of which were decided by District Judge Hand of New
York. The first of these is Beer v. Clyde S. S. Co. 12 It was there
held that no distinction existed between the wording in regard to actions for death and actions for personal injuries, and that the statute
fairly included by reference the removal provision of the Employers'
Liability Act. The next two cases, Herrera v. Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co.,' 3 and Martin v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,' 4 reiterate the doctrine previously declared in the
Beer v. Clyde case. The decision in the Martin case goes to a greater
length, Judge Hand basing his conclusion upon the historical development of Admiralty law respecting actions for death and personal
injury.'i

In the decisions above set forth, while they deal with the jurisdiction
of the state courts over actions brought under Section 33, the con10299 Fed. 957 (N. Y., Feb. 13, 1924).
U 298 Fed. 547 (Wash., May 14, 1924).

"300 Fed. 561 (N. Y., Dec. 3, 1923).
300 Fed. 563 (N. Y., 'ay 2, 1924).
1 Fed. (2nd) 603 (N. Y., June 6, 1924).
Judge Hand says: "No civil right of action e.isted at common law in the
case of death from wrongful act. Such a cause of action was first granted by
Lord Campbell's Act, and has subsequently been carried forward by various
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clusions are based upon the opinions of the various judges as to whether
or not the removal provision of the Employers' Liability Act was intended to be included therein. This question is also determined in a
number of other cases, the conclusions of which are based upon the
construction of the last sentence of Section 33, above set out. The
Wenzler case, supra, touched upon this question.
The conclusion reached in the Wenzler case was concurred in by
the later case of Nox v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp."

Judge Hotchkiss says: "But the act says nothing at all about state
courts. Its words are as above quoted, and the maxim "Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius would approve of an interpretation excluding the
state courts from jurisdiction. This interpretation accords with such
decisions as have already been made in federal courts."
The case of Prieto v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.7
occurred at the same time as the Nox case and concurs in its holding.
Judge Dike states that while the wording of the statute is sufficient
to indicate or designate a District Court of the United States, it is
insufficient as an adequate description of a state court. It is stated
that Congress provided, in the Employers' Liability Act, for concurrent
jurisdiction under that act, and if the same was intended in the Jones
Act, the same provision would have been made.
A very decided dissent to this view occurred in Tammis v. Panama

R. Co.,"6 where Judge Heely states, in effect, that there is nothing
which should prevent the exercise of state authority over this subject,
for the reason that seamen are given the same rights as have been delegated to interstate railway employes, and that the rights of the latter
are constantly before the state courts for adjudication. An express
dissent to the Wenzler Nox and Prieto cases appears in the case of
Lynott v. Great Lakes Transit Corp."9 While the use of the words
"court of the district", Judge Sears remarks, must necessarily be construed to mean the District Court of the United States, it does not
impliedly exclude the long recognized and established jurisdiction of
the state courts in such matters. It was held that the words in question provide the jurisdiction of the United States courts when the aid
thereof is sought, but that the jurisdiction of the state courts remains
as heretofore to apply the common law remedy
A new light is thrown upon this question by the decisions of District

statutes in all common law jurisdictions. Section thirty-three of the Jones
Act, in dealing with death cases, therefore, appropriately, if not necessarily,
describes the Federal Employers' Liability Act as a statute 'conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees. In the
case of personal injuries to railway employees, the remedy already existed at
common law. There can, however, be no reasonable ground urged for forbidding removal in death cases which does not apply to personal injury cases."
"193
"117
"002
"202

N. Y
Misc.
App.
App.

S. 340 (Jan.
Rep. 703 193
Div. 226, 195
Div. 613, 195

2, 1922).
N. Y. S. 312 (Jan., 1922).
N. Y. S. 587 (June 29, 1922).
N. Y. S. 13.
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Judge Campbell, Eastern District of New York, in three cases, Caceres
v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,20 Wienbroer v. U S.
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,2 and Tillard v. U S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,2 2 all being handed down upon May
29, 1924. It was held that the provision of Section 33 under consideration related not to the general jurisdiction of the court, but only to
venue. In the opinion of Judge Campbell the jurisdiction of the state
courts under the act was not thereby
divested but remains concurrent
23
with that of the federal courts.

Johnson v. Panama R. Co. 24 is the most important case dealing with
this subject. There were two questions involved in this action, namely,
first, did the federal court have jurisdiction even though the parties
were residents of the same state, and second, did the defendant waive
his right to object to the venue because of his failure to appear specially for that purpose. The court held that Section 33 of the Jones Act
gave federal courts jurisdiction even though the parties were residents
of the same state. As to the second point it was held that the wording
of the last sentence of the act merely prescribed the venue should the
action be brought in the federal court, and did not provide the
jurisdiction of actions brought under the act. The court said. "It
follows that, as defendant failed to appear specially and move to dismiss, it has waived its right to object to the venue.
" This
case was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 5 and also by the
Supreme Court of the United States.2"
1 29 9 Fed. 968.
1 99 Fed. 97.
2 1 Fed. (2nd) 570.
=Judge Campbell, in the Wienbroer case, stated: "In my opinion Congress
did not, by the words 'the court of the district in which the employer defendant
reskdes or in wich his principal office is located', mean the federal court district
when the action is brought in the state courts, nor the state judicial district
when the action is brought in the New York state courts, but did mean, when
the action is brought in the New York state courts, the county in wich the
defendant resides or has lis principal office as the county is in reality the district for the purpose of determimng where the actions are to be brought"
1277 Fed. 859- affirmed on appeal and on rehearing, 989 Fed. 964 (N. Y.,
Oct 27, 1921), affirmed 264 U. S. 375, 44 S. C. Rep. 391, 68 Law Ed. 748 (Apr.
7, 1924).
'289 Fed. 964 (Feb. lo, 1923, May 14, 1923).
'The court there said, in a short resume of the historical basis of such
statutes as the one in question: "Beginmng with the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress has pursued the policy of investing the federal courts
with a
general jurisdiction expressed in terms applicable alike to all of them and of
regulating the venue by separate provisions designating the particular district
in which a defendant shall be sued, such as the district of which he is an
inhabitant or in which he has a place of business-the purpose of the venue
provisions being to prevent defendants from being compelled to answer and
defend in remote districts against their will. This policy
was carried
into the Judicial Code, and is shown in sections 24 and 58 (Comp. Stats. §§ 991
and 1033), one embodying general jurisdictional provisions applicable to rights
under subsequent laws as well as laws then existing, and the other containing
particular venue provisions. A reading of the provisions now before us with
those sections, and in the light of the policy carried into them, makes it rea-

